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Equitable But Ineffective: How the
Principle of Common But Differentiated
Responsibilities Hobbles the Global Fight
Against Climate Change
by Mary J. Bortscheller*

S

Introduction

cientists now predict that despite global efforts to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions, climate change effects like
long-term droughts and significant sea-level rise are inevitable.1 Consequently, the climate change crisis demands a comprehensive international response, with meaningful participation
by all the major greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emitters.2 The current
climate regime embodied in the Kyoto Protocol distinguishes
between developed and developing countries in a way that maintains an invidious inertia in the international fight against climate
change.
China is a major GHG emitter that does not have any obligations to reduce emissions under the Kyoto Protocol, the current
binding international climate change regime.3 The international
community took a fresh look at the Protocol at the 15th Conference of the Parties (“COP”) in Copenhagen in December 2009. A
critical question at that time was whether China would agree to
reduce its GHG emissions; China’s position impacts the global
community’s ability to combat climate change because other
major GHG emitters (most notably the United States) have used
China’s lack of binding commitments to justify their non-participation in the Kyoto Protocol.4 Positive signs were evident during
and in the wake of the Copenhagen COP, however, when China
played a key role in drafting the Copenhagen Accord, and further acknowledged the need for all countries to take action to fight
climate change.5 Notably, China agreed to international verification of domestic mitigation measures, a significant step towards
increased transparency in the regime.6
The fight against climate change is necessarily a global one,
and China’s full participation in the United Nations’ Framework
Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) is especially crucial in the short term.7 And although the Copenhagen COP did
not produce a binding document, future COPs will. In so doing,
the international community must reassess the application of the
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (“CDR”),
which divides countries into two primary categories—developing
and developed—and determines obligations accordingly.8
This article examines China’s unique situation within the
UNFCCC and argues that the current interpretation of CDR is
politically and practically flawed because it leaves out emerging
economies that are major GHG emitters. The principle of CDR, as
currently applied, does not distinguish among developing nations
49

in a way that recognizes the critical importance of emerging
economies like China.9 China and other large emerging economies, no longer fit comfortably in the CDR’s existing developing country category.10 A third category is therefore necessary to
encompass emerging economies like China. The international climate regime’s failure to actively engage China presents a problem
for the entire international community.11 Indeed, as an emerging
economy and a major GHG emitter, and as an international actor
whose participation in the climate regime impacts other major
emitters’ compliance, it is essential that China actively participates in the successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol.12 Current
incentives in the Protocol are not sufficient to persuade China to
accept emission reduction commitments; consequently, the next
protocol requires a combination of extra-legal incentives to convince China to take a more active role.13 Further, while China
has made statements about working together within the UNFCCC
structure, the United States and other developed countries have
not yet succeeded in persuading China to accept binding commitments in a climate change regime.14

Common But Differentiated Responsibilities
In recognition of the daunting environmental problems it
faces, China is shifting toward increased domestic environmental
responsibility, making resource conservation and environmentalism major policy goals.15 China’s commitment to the international fight against climate change, however, is not on par with
other major emitters like the United States and Europe because it
does not involve any GHG emissions reductions.16 This situation
results from the application of CDR in the international climate
change regime.17 The presence of the principle of CDR, in turn,
is the result of a complex negotiation process between developing
and developed countries.
During the UNFCCC negotiations in 1992, both developed
and developing countries had concerns about who would be
the first to reduce GHG emissions, and who would finance the
associated costs.18 Developed countries wanted an inclusive
international agreement for maximum effect and legitimacy.19
Developing countries hesitated to commit themselves to reduction targets when they had historically not contributed to global
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greenhouse gas stocks, nor benefited from such emissions in the
form of elevated standards of living.20 Thus, in order to reach
a comprehensive international agreement that brought all the
necessary players to the table, the first COP used the principle
of CDR to strike a political compromise with continuing legal
implications.21
The principle makes developed countries the first actors in
reducing emissions, and allows developing countries to follow
over time. The notion of common but differentiated responsibilities is not new: it reflects general principles of equity in international law.22 The principle was present in nascent form in the
1987 Montreal Protocol, which acknowledged the “special situation” of developing countries by allowing them to delay their
compliance with Protocol control measures for ten years.23 The
UNFCCC has attempted to duplicate this successful model in a
climate change context.24

CDR Distinguishes Between Developed and
Developing Countries
The principle of CDR now embodied in the UNFCCC means
that two factors determine a nation’s obligations concerning climate change. The first factor is a particular nation’s contribution to climate change through GHG emissions; the second is its
economic and technological capacity to reduce emissions.25 The
CDR is primarily backward-looking, as it focuses on past contributions to existing stocks of emissions and lays out responsibilities intended to have remedial effects.26
Based upon the two central considerations of CDR, the
UNFCCC distinguishes between member countries, with the
primary division occurring between developed and developing
country parties.27 Though the developed/developing paradigm
dominates in the Convention, there is also intra-group differentiation between types of developed countries and types of developing countries.28
In practice, the principle of CDR means that developed countries are subject to binding commitments to cut GHG emissions.29
Further, certain developed countries are responsible for money
and technology transfer to aid developing countries in adapting
to and mitigating the effects of climate change.30 In contrast, the
UNFCCC does not require developing countries to reduce emissions or contribute funding, because of their minor contribution to
existing GHG stocks and their reduced economic and technological capacity.31 Moreover, the Convention pays special attention
to the plight of so-called “least developed countries,” as well as
countries that will be especially harmed by climate change.32
Country designation as Annex I or II is self-imposed.33 In
other words, the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC is not
vested with the power to determine which countries are developed and which are developing. Rather, any country desiring to
be included in Annex I or II “may” notify the Secretary-General
of the United Nations that it “intends to be bound” by developed
country commitments.34 There are no further provisions in the
UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol that elaborate on the process
of categorizing member nations.35 This makes the international
law-making process on climate change especially vulnerable
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to political horsetrading, as entering into binding agreements is
entirely voluntary for countries designated under the UNFCCC as
“developing.”
As the first measure arising from the UNFCCC with binding commitments carrying the force of law, the Kyoto Protocol
set specific emission reduction commitments for each developed
country party.36 To date, 183 nations and the European Community have ratified the instrument; the United States is the only
developed country party that has not.37 Developing countries
have no binding commitments under the Kyoto Protocol but do
agree to monitor emissions, promote sustainable development,
and cooperate with the Conference of the Parties in mitigating and
adapting to the impacts of climate change.38 China is designated
a developing country party, and therefore did not commit itself to
any emissions targets when it signed and ratified the UNFCCC
and subsequent Kyoto Protocol.39 The highly-anticipated December 2009 Copenhagen COP did not produce a binding successor-instrument to the Kyoto Protocol, but instead resulted in the
Copenhagen Accord.40

China’s Unique Situation in the International
Climate Change Regime
CDR guides China’s official position with respect to the international climate change regime.41 As a self-designated developing country party, China’s current obligations under the Kyoto
Protocol extend only to soft commitments like GHG monitoring
and information-sharing, promoting sustainable development, and
enhancing carbon-absorbing resources, like forests.42 A key contributor to the drafting of the Copenhagen Accord in December
2009 at the Copenhagen COP, China nonetheless remains among
the group of countries which is not legally obligated to reduce
GHG emissions.43
One of China’s chief strategies for addressing global climate change is to “uphold” the principle of CDR, which currently
allows China to avoid emissions reduction commitments.44 In
support of its position, China advances several arguments, noting
the nation’s relative poverty, its relatively low per capita emissions, and low level of responsibility for the existing stock of
GHG emissions.45 Moreover, China argues that it would not be
fair to deprive a developing nation of the right to emit freely in the
course of its development, as developed countries have already
done.46
Although China underscores its low development status,
recent history shows that the country is unique among developing
nations, as it has rapidly gained stature in the international community.47 Starting in 1979 with its Reform and Opening Policy,
China has implemented an ambitious plan to modernize the oncemarginalized nation.48 An illustration of China’s remarkable success at modernization is the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, which
engaged the world with China in an unprecedented way. The last
decade has made it clear that China is an increasingly dominant
player on the global stage.49
Even as China gains prominence in the international community, its GHG emissions and air pollution problems are mounting; stark statistics detailing the situation abound.50 Perhaps most
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importantly, China now leads the world in annual GHG emissions.51 Further, a recent World Bank report estimated that air
pollution causes about 750,000 deaths per year in China.52 The
World Bank also reported that the nation is home to sixteen of
the world’s twenty most-polluted cities.53 Atmospheric brown
clouds, produced by automobile emissions and coal-fired power
plants, have reduced sunlight and interfered with crop yields in
several cities.54
In light of these facts, the Chinese government has given
more attention to environmental issues.55 Because environmental degradation has emerged as an increasingly popular cause of
citizen activism, China’s leadership will not be able to ignore the
issue in the future.56 With an eye on its own continued legitimacy,
the Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”) is concerned with the delicate balancing of continued economic growth against the domestic and international imperatives for environmental protection.57

A Sound Principle, With Flawed Application
In its stated terms, CDR is sound and equitable; it has widespread acceptance in the international community, and will continue to play a central role in climate negotiations.58 Although
some scholars find the principle objectionable, their opposition
arises out of a different interpretation of what is equitable for
developed and developing country parties.59 Critics argue that it
is too difficult to predict the differentiated needs of developing
countries in light of scientific uncertainty about the specifics of
adverse climate change impacts.60 While it is true that some scientific uncertainty remains about the impacts of climate change,
widespread agreement exists that developing countries will bear
a disproportionate amount of damages from climate change.61
Therefore, the principle of CDR correctly seeks to bridge the
divide.
Detractors also find it questionable that multi-lateral environmental agreements should hold developed countries accountable for their historic emissions stocks, finding it unjust to ask
modern-day citizens to make amends for pollution emitted generations ago.62 This argument fails to acknowledge the benefits
that current generations have derived and continue to derive from
living in a developed country. For example, a high standard of
living, solid infrastructure, and economic strength are all aftereffects of development and industrialization achieved through
significant pollution.63 Because citizens of developed countries
currently enjoy the fruits of past GHG emissions, it is only fair
to require those nations to bear a greater burden in solving the
climate change problem.

The Principle of CDR in Application is Politically
Ineffective
Notwithstanding the soundness of CDR, the principle is
problematic because it has created a paradigm that, if it persists, will not allow the nations of the world to effectively combat global warming.64 The current interpretation of CDR in the
Kyoto Protocol is politically ineffective because its exception
of emerging economy, major-emitter countries like China has a
chilling effect on global climate change negotiations.65 Because
of its status as the leading GHG emitter and its rising prominence
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in the international community, China’s participation is especially crucial to a multilateral climate change agreement. Within
the United States, the fact that the Kyoto Protocol did not include
obligations for China was advanced by President Bush and prominent congressional leaders as a reason for refusing to ratify the
document.66 This is a direct result of the vague construction of the
principle of CDR in the current climate regime.
For example, the regime does not sufficiently distinguish
between developing countries like China and Botswana.67 The
closest it comes to distinguishing between developing country
parties is to emphasize the need to help developing countries
that are “particularly vulnerable” to the adverse impacts of climate change.68 Accordingly, China frames its policy statements
on climate change to fit this characterization; indeed, a recent
government White Paper echoes the UNFCCC’s provision distinguishing the especially susceptible developing countries.69
By describing itself as a country that is “particularly vulnerable”
to climate change, China seeks to fit its increasingly square reality into the round hole of the developed country category of the
UNFCCC.70 Unfortunately, the language of the UNFCCC is not
sufficiently specific to prevent such subtle mischaracterizations,
which then lead to an undesirable result.71
China’s willingness to accept increased responsibility under a
more nuanced interpretation of the CDR could contribute significantly to the success of a post-Kyoto regime.72 On the other hand,
without at least some corresponding commitments by China,
the United States is unlikely to commit to the Kyoto Protocol’s
successor.73 The interpretation of the CDR and the concomitant
assignment of obligations, therefore, have major political implications for the success of a multilateral climate regime.

The Principle of CDR in Application is Practically
Ineffective
Any climate change agreement that excludes China and other
emerging economies from emission reduction targets will not
have practical utility because these countries’ rates of emissions
are increasing rapidly. Although China leads the world in GHG
emissions, it is in complete compliance with the Kyoto Protocol
under the current interpretation of CDR.74 Indeed, emissions from
China and other developing nations are growing so fast today that
even if all developed countries reduced their emissions to zero,
emissions from developing countries will cause global concentrations of GHGs to increase by over eighteen percent in sixty
years.75 This would be a dramatic increase, as GHG concentrations have increased by thirty-five percent in the last 200 years,
and this comparatively gradual shift has set in motion the current
climate change crisis.76 These facts illustrate the present danger
in failing to engage developing countries—particularly China—in
more concrete efforts at long-term GHG emissions reduction.77 A
continued application of CDR in a way that allows major-emitter,
developing countries to avoid reduction targets will result in a
considerable amount of GHG emissions left unregulated.78
Moreover, because CDR is chiefly backward-looking, it
does not provide any mechanism to adapt to the evolving global
reality.79 The principle is now focused on the existing stocks of
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emissions that were produced when the major economies of the
United States and Europe industrialized and thus does not account
for the current and future emissions of emerging economies.80
The remedial nature of the principle of CDR in the UNFCCC is
necessary, as developed nations emitted the majority of the current stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, and they are
comparatively well-situated to reduce emissions.81 Nevertheless, it is not sufficient for the principle to be merely backwardlooking because China and other developing countries are making
significant current contributions to the global stock of emissions,
and will continue to do so in increasing proportions.82 Without
consideration for future emissions, the current application of
CDR excludes major portions of emissions from regulation and
therefore hinders the overall effectiveness of the climate change
regime.83

No Category Currently Exists to Properly
Address Emerging Economies Like China
The current division of obligations created by the principle of
CDR in the Kyoto Protocol lacks a proper category to encompass
China, an emerging economy and major-emitter that continues to
develop rapidly.84 The Protocol adopts the language of CDR from
the UNFCCC, and does not further differentiate among the group
of developing country parties.85 Rather, it re-emphasizes the distinctions of the UNFCCC, calling on the Annex I developed country parties to implement policies that minimize the adverse effects
of climate change, including the adverse impacts on other developing country parties and “especially” those types of developing
countries listed in Article 4.8 of the UNFCCC.86
Despite China’s efforts to depict itself as one of the developing countries that is “particularly vulnerable” to adverse climate
change impacts, economic data does not support that characterization.87 Further, recent history—from the Beijing Olympics
to China’s influence on global financial issues—also contradicts
the idea that China is a developing country by demonstrating its
relatively advanced level of development and sophistication.88
Plainly China does not fit into the same developing country category as the least developed countries in Africa or especiallyvulnerable small island nations, and thus should not have similar
rights and obligations.89
Furthermore, it is highly relevant that China recently passed
the United States as the leading global emitter of GHGs because
it demonstrates the shifting realities of the climate change crisis.90
China may well want to maintain the current unnuanced construction of CDR, which allows it to self-categorize as a developing country without binding reduction commitment targets. If
the world were not in such a precipitous position with regard to
climate change—as most scientists agree it is—under basic principles of equity China would not be required to take the measures
the moment now demands of them. 91 Consequently, a set of differentiated responsibilities that allow a major-emitting country
like China to go unregulated is fundamentally flawed.92
Although China does not fit into the current developing country category, neither does it fit in with the developed countries
of Annex I and Annex II.93 For all of its recent progress, China
Winter 2010

has not yet fully industrialized and continues to develop both its
physical infrastructure and its economy.94 A useful metaphor is
to envision China as consisting of a set of relatively developed
islands located in a sea of people living in developing country
conditions.95 Indeed, hundreds of millions of Chinese remain in
poverty, a characteristic China distinctly does not share with the
developed nations in Europe or the United States.96 According to
the 2008 World Development Index, all of the Annex I and Annex
II countries qualified as highly developed; China, by contrast, has
only medium development.97 Neither a developed, nor a least
developed country, China does not fit into either category under
the current application of the principle of CDR.98

The UNFCCC Needs a New Category of
Emitter to Ensure Greater Participation
Although member countries must agree to be bound by the
protocols of the UNFCCC, there is no clear mechanism in the
Convention to determine the degree to which each country will
be bound.99 Therefore, the regime relies upon individual actors’
sense of responsibility for damage done to a common good—the
climate—and provides little else as incentive to commit to reducing emissions. The UNFCCC as a legal instrument relies on selfdesignation and elective commitments made in the global public
interest.100
China and other emerging economies are unlikely to undertake the costly and burdensome task of reducing GHG emissions
solely in the interest of an international common good.101 Therefore, because it lacks both the teeth to impose binding commitments upon parties and sufficient incentives to draw parties to
voluntarily commit, the UNFCCC has very few legal tools at its
disposal to obtain increased commitments out of unwilling parties.

The International Community Must Use A Variety
of Incentives in Climate Negotiations
To many observers and participants, the 2009 Copenhagen
COP ended rather disappointingly, without a binding successor
to the Kyoto Protocol.102 The international community, however,
retains the opportunity, and in fact the imperative, to create a more
effective climate change agreement in the near future. The division of responsibilities under the CDR is one area that must be
revised.
China could be persuaded by a combination of extra-legal
incentives to participate in a future international climate regime
that entails binding commitments.103 The incentives include the
prospect of increased global stature and an opportunity to efficiently solve an international problem that domestically poses
great dangers, as well as pressure from internal and external
sources.104
The first key incentive for China to accept binding commitments in a successor to the Kyoto Protocol would be to mitigate
the serious threats that climate change impacts pose to Chinese
public health.105 As China’s GHG emissions increase, it will
become more difficult for the Chinese government to ignore the
link between outdoor air pollution and mortality.106 Significantly
reducing GHG emissions could deliver important improvements
in public health while also contributing to the global effort to
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fight climate change.107 Second, greater participation in the postKyoto regime would provide a corresponding opportunity for
China to influence the design of the next international climate
change agreement to their national benefit.108 Because successful
international regimes distribute net benefits to participating countries, if China takes the lead among developing nations in fighting
global climate change, its position at the negotiating table will be
enhanced and benefits flowing to China from the structure of the
plan would reflect that position.109 Finally, greater participation
in the fight against climate change would further enhance China’s
reputation as an international leader and indicate to the world
that China envisions a leadership role that involves greater global
responsibility.110
In addition to the incentives directly derived from greater
commitment to fighting climate change, China faces pressure to
act from domestic as well as foreign sources.111 Within China,
intense GHG emissions have translated to incredible air pollution, which in turn has caused a corresponding public health problem.112 This situation poses a threat to the legitimacy of the CCP,
which has thus far focused on rapid development at the expense of
environmental quality.113 Further, the danger of widespread civil
unrest over climate change impacts is real.114 China may need to
take more aggressive action on air pollution and climate change
and deliver tangible results in order for the CCP to maintain control over the country.115
Finally, China may face increasing pressure to reduce emissions from developing countries that are not enjoying a similar
economic boom.116 For example, small island developing countries and those countries the UNFCCC designates as least developed may resent that China lacks binding commitments yet is a
major GHG emitter.117 Likewise, developing countries that are
not experiencing rapid economic development should take a more
aggressive and vocal role in negotiations. Developing nations, on
average, will suffer greater costs than developed countries in the
wake of significant climate change.118 These actors must rally
support during the international climate negotiations for all major
emitters to take responsibility in reducing emissions.
Although the UNFCCC does not include many legal tools,
the COP could pursue other strategies to obtain greater Chinese
participation. If engaged in a general appeal to enlightened pragmatism, China may agree to some binding commitments in the
successor to the Kyoto Protocol so long as it can expect both
global and domestic net benefits.119

A New Category For High-emitting, Emerging
Economies
If China can be persuaded to commit to reducing emissions
in an international climate change regime, this could involve the
creation of a category creating obligations at a level somewhere
in between those of developed and developing countries parties. Because the principle of CDR applied in the Kyoto Protocol
already has created distinctions within both the developed and the
developing country categories, the post-Kyoto regime could carry
the differentiation one step further to take into account emerging
economies.
Specifically, one option would be to create a third distinct
category for China and other similarly-situated countries like
India and Indonesia.120 This category would require emerging
economies to reduce emissions to a lesser degree than developed
nations, but their commitments would increase over time as the
emerging economies attain developed nation status. In a converse
construction to the relationship between Annex I and Annex II
countries, emerging economies would commit to some binding
emission reduction targets, and would continue to receive the benefit of money and technology transfer from developed countries in
Annex I.121 China would certainly fall into an emerging economy
category and thus could be subject to a set of commitments occupying the middle ground between developed countries and developing countries.122

Conclusion
Climate change is a complex, daunting problem requiring a
high degree of international cooperation for any effective solution. Thus far, the nations of the world have agreed on the existence of a problem, but a functional solution remains elusive.123
The Copenhagen Accord represents a step in the right direction,
as major-emitting, emerging economies like China and India have
signaled their intent to engage in the UNFCCC in the future.124
Going forward at subsequent COPs, China and the rest of the
world must reexamine the current interpretation of CDR, and realize that a more nuanced categorization model is necessary. China
can and must be persuaded—perhaps through an appeal to Chinese pride and pragmatism—to accept binding emissions-reduction quotas in a revised application of the principle of common
but differentiated responsibilities.125 Although achieving such
goals will be difficult, it is nevertheless incumbent upon the global
community to seek out a feasible international regime to fight the
adverse impacts of climate change.

Endnotes: Equitable But Ineffective: How the Principle of Common
But Differentiated Responsibilities Hobbles the Global
Fight Against Climate Change
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See Juliet Eilperin, Long Droughts, Rising Seas Predicted Despite Future
CO2 Curbs, Wash. Post, Jan. 27, 2009, at A4 (reporting the results of an international study showing that such impacts could persist for as long as 1,000
years).
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U.S. Climate Change Policy (2007), available at http://www.nftc.org/default/
Trade%20Policy/Climate_Change/Climate%20Change%20Paper.pdf (discussing previous legislative proposals to address climate change). If a parallel bill
passes in the Senate, a joint committee must be formed to craft a compromise.
See H.R. Con. Res. 93, 108th Cong. (2003) (educating the public about how
laws are enacted).
9 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal
Instrument — Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter GATT]. See Broder, supra note 6 (noting that the bill contains a provision
requiring the President to impose a tariff on goods imported from countries that
do not act to limit their global warming emissions and that President Obama
thinks such a provision could be “illegal and counterproductive”).
10 See Wold, supra note 3, at 447 (noting that GATT has been successful in
significantly reducing tariffs over the past 60 years); Slayde Hawkins, Note,
Skirting Protectionism: A GHG-Based Trade Restriction under the WTO, 20
Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 427, 430 (2008) (noting that such limitations on trade
barriers are in place because they have the potential to negatively affect the
world economy).
11 GATT, supra note 9, at arts. I, III. See Wold, supra note 3, at 447-8 (recognizing that Articles I and III also apply under the General Agreement on Trade
in Services (“GATS”) and Technical Barriers to Trade (“TBT”) Agreement).
12 See GATT, supra note 9, at art. XX (permitting measures: “(b) necessary to
protect human, animal or plant life or health . . . ; [or] (g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective
in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption . . . ”).
Such measures must “not [be] applied in a manner which would constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade.” Id.
13 See generally H.R. 2454 supra note 5, § 768 (establishing the international
reserve allowance program).
14 See Hawkins, supra note 10, at 442 (discussing similar provisions in the
Lieberman-Warner bill, S. 2191, 110th Cong. (2007) and concluding that
requiring different allowances from different countries for “like” products
violates Article I); see H.R. 2454 supra note 5, § 768(a)(1)(A) (specifying that
the Administrator shall issue regulations regarding the details of IRAP); id. §
768(b) (establishing that the number of IRAs required for a covered good in
an eligible industrial sector shall be adjusted for the benefit conferred by free
allowances and the value of emission allowance rebates distributed to eligible
domestic sectors).
15 See H.R. 2454 supra note 5, § 768(a)(1)(E) (excepting goods that originate
in “the least developed of developing countries,” countries with de minimus
GHG emissions, and countries that are party to a nationally-enforceable international agreement). Because international trade agreements provide different

standards for developing countries in other circumstances, the exception for
goods originating in “any foreign country that the United Nations has identified as among the least developed of developing countries” may be considered
appropriate. See id. § 768(a)(1)(E)(ii).
16 See H.R. 2454 supra note 5, § 722(b) (establishing the methods of demonstrating compliance for domestic actors); id. § 722(d) (listing the rules regarding the use of offset credits, term offset credits, and international emissions
allowances); id. §§ 728, 737, & 743 (discussing the terms of international
emissions allowances, international offset credits and domestic offset credits);
id. §§ 725, 782 (establishing the allocation, banking, and borrowing of allowances for domestic actors); id. § 721(f) (compensatory allowances are permitted, under certain circumstances, for the destruction of fluorinated gases). See
also Dworsky, supra note 8, at 5 (concluding that ACES provides industry
with more allowances than needed to maintain profits and that as a result the
“most energy-intensive industries are likely to enjoy increased profits”). Cf.
Matthew Nicely & Valerie Ellis, The Potential Clash of Climate Change Policy
and International Trade Law, 4 Bus. L. Brief (Am. U) 4, 7 (2007) (noting
that importers were largely ineligible for subsidies such as low-cost allowances through early reduction efforts, international and domestic offsets, and
sequestration projects in the Low Carbon Economy Act of 2007, S. 1766, 110th
Cong. (2007)). But see WTO/UNEP Report, supra note 3, at xviii (noting that
the potential insufficiency of alleviations and exemptions begs the question as
to whether measures to protect competitiveness and reduce carbon leakage are
necessary).
17 See Nicely & Ellis, supra note 16, at 7 (discussing such provisions in the
Low Carbon Economy Act of 2007, S. 1766, 110th Cong. (2007) and finding
that opportunities for domestic industries to earn allowances at lower prices due
to the time of the year, along with additional avenues to earn permits to emit
greenhouse gases that are not available to importers, can result in an accusation
that the U.S. is treating imported products less favorably than domestic products, because such measures lower costs of production and manufacturing for
domestic producers); Wold, supra note 3, at 491 (offering that some advocates
claim that offsets stifle innovations because permitting compliance via investing
in forest conservation is a “low-tech” solution). See also Wold, supra note 3, at
491 (noting that advocates believe that banking promotes early action by lowering costs). However, banking has the possibility to disrupt emissions trading by:
a) limiting innovation; b) decreasing the rates of overall emissions reductions;
and c) lowering the value of allowances. Id.
18 WTO/UNEP Report, supra note 3, at xviii. Border adjustments, to compensate for internal taxes, are a common measure upon the sale and consumption
of goods such as cigarettes or alcohol. Id. at xix. See generally WTO, Trade and
Environment, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_e.htm (last
visited Mar. 1, 2010).

Endnotes: Equitable But Ineffective: How the Principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities
Hobbles the Global Fight Against Climate Change continued from page 53
2 See U.N. News Centre, World Has ‘Responsibility to Deliver’ in Year of
Crises, Ban Declares, Dec. 17, 2008, http://www.un.org/ apps/news/story.
asp?NewsID=29337&Cr=crises&Cr1= (last visited Jan. 29, 2009) (quoting UN
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on the urgent need for a comprehensive and
balanced international climate change regime).
3 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 3, Dec. 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol] (requiring that only the “Parties included in Annex I shall . . . ensure that
their aggregate [GHG] emissions . . . do not exceed their assigned amounts,”
while China is not an Annex I party).
4 See Juliet Eilperin, Developing Nations Plan Emission Cuts, Wash. Post,
Dec. 12, 2008, at A10 [hereinafter Eilperin, Developing Nations] (reporting that
getting emerging economies like China to limit their GHG emissions is considered crucial to the success of a global climate regime); see also Pew Center
on Global Climate Change and The Asia Society, Common Challenge, Collaborative Response: A Roadmap for U.S.-China Cooperation on Energy and
Climate Change 18 (Jan. 2009) [hereinafter Pew Center Report] (emphasizing
that China, along with the United States, must actively work to reduce GHG
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emissions in order to solve the global climate change problem).
Barbara Finamore, China’s Recent Steps Towards Meeting Its Climate
Commitments, Mar. 5, 2010, http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/bfinamore/
china_pushes_ahead.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2010) (reporting from a postCopenhagen round-up conference in Beijing that China views Copenhagen
as representing an unprecedented common political effort on a global scale to
address climate change and expressing optimism that “China is not sitting still
when it comes to addressing climate change”).
6 United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of the
Parties, Copenhagen Accord (advance unedited version) at 3 (Dec. 18, 2009)
[hereinafter Copenhagen Accord] available at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/
cop_15/application/pdf/cop15_cph_auv.pdf (agreeing that Non-Annex I Parties
like China will report their mitigation actions, and these reports “will be subject
to international measurement, reporting and verification”).
7 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9,
1992, 1771 U.N.T.S 107, 31 I.L.M. 849, entered into force 1 Jan. 1989 [hereinafter UNFCCC]; see, e.g., Jonathan B. Wiener, Climate Change Policy and
Policy Change in China, 55 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1805, 1807 (2008) (emphasizing
5

Sustainable Development Law & Policy

that 2009 is a critical year for international climate change policy, and arguing
that an international climate regime must engage China in order to solve the
climate change problem).
8 See UNFCCC, supra note 7, art. 3.1 (setting forth that developed country parties should “take the lead” in fighting climate change and its adverse
impacts).
9 See id., art. 4.8 (emphasizing that the parties should pay special attention to
the needs of particularly vulnerable developing countries; no reference is made
to developing countries that may have more capacity to fight climate change).
10 See, e.g., Pamela Constable, The Anti-Junket is Coming to Town: As World
Leaders Converge on D.C., Nothing But Business on the Agenda, Wash. Post,
Nov. 15, 2008, at A10 (noting China’s recent participation in the G20 Summit);
see also Philip Hersh, Beijing 2008 Opening Ceremony, L.A. Times, Aug. 9,
2008, at Special Section 1 (characterizing the opening ceremony of the Olympics as an announcement to the world that China’s 1.3 billion citizens were
entering the 21st century).
11 E.g., Kenneth Lieberthal and David Sandalow, China Center at Brookings,
Overcoming Obstacles to U.S.-China Cooperation on Climate Change 3, 26
(January 2009), available at http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2009/01_climate_change_lieberthal_sandalow.aspx (stating that both the United States and
China must reduce emissions in order to adequately fight climate change and
noting that China’s lack of commitments in the Kyoto Protocol was a major
reason the United States rejected the Protocol).
12 See Wiener, supra note 7, at 1809-10 (arguing that it is crucial for the United
States, China, and other major emitters to cooperate in order to effectively
reduce global GHG emissions); see also Cass R. Sunstein, The World vs. the
United States and China? The Complex Climate Change Incentives of the Leading Greenhouse Gas Emitters, 55 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1675, 1676 (2008) [hereinafter Sunstein, The World vs. the United States and China?] (observing that the
practical benefits of GHG reductions depend on broad participation by major
emitters).
13 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, pmbl. (adopting the principles and provisions of the UNFCCC, which do not include incentives to reduce emissions
beyond a recognition of the common concern of mankind).
14 See China Hopes for Major Progress at Mexico Climate Conference, China
Daily, Mar. 7, 2010, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-03/07/content_9550951.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2010) (quoting Foreign Minister Yang
Jiechi, “China will work actively with other countries…to tackle the climate
change challenge according to the [UNFCCC], Kyoto Protocol, Bali road map
and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.”).
15 See, e.g., Gov.cn, Ten Features in China’s 11th Five-Year Plan, Mar. 8,
2006, http://www.gov.cn/english/2006-03/08/content_246945.htm (last visited
Feb. 18, 2009) (highlighting China’s recent policy goals to, for example, build
an environmentally-friendly society).
16 See UNFCCC, supra note 7, at Annex I, II (demonstrating that China is not
on the list of parties that have accepted binding commitments to reduce GHG
emissions and assist with money and technology transfer to developing country
parties).
17 See generally UNFCCC, supra note 7 (referencing differentiated obligations
for all parties throughout the instrument).
18 See, e.g., Eilperin, Developing Nations, supra note 4, (quoting South Korea’s
climate ambassador on the existence of a culture of finger-pointing and mistrust
among the member countries, where each country insists that others move first
to cut emissions).
19 See Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 38
Envtl. Rep. News & Analysis 10566, 10572 (2008) [hereinafter Sunstein, Of
Montreal and Kyoto] (noting that a broader agreement including China and
India would not only increase the global benefits of GHG reduction, but also
would make plans to reduce domestic carbon emissions more palatable for the
United States and other developed countries).
20 See Daniel Barstow Magraw, The Worst of Times, or “It Wouldn’t Be Cool,”
38 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis 10575, 10577 (concluding that this history led to a sense of inequity felt by nearly all of the developing countries, and
therefore hindered the negotiation process).
21 See id. (explaining that, unlike during Montreal Protocol negotiations,
developing countries were extremely reluctant to accept any binding reduction
targets until developed countries indicated that they would actually reduce their
emissions first).
22 See Centre for Int’l Sustainable Dev. L., The Principle of Common But
Differentiated Responsibilities: Origins & Scope, 1 (Aug. 26, 2002), http://
www.cisdl.org/pdf/brief_common.pdf (last visited Jan. 7, 2009) (finding CDR
to be widely accepted in treaty and state practices).
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Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, art. 5, Sept.
16, 1987, S. Treaty Doc. No. 10, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 I.L.M. 1541.
24 See Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto, supra note 19, at 10566, 10568
(deeming the negotiating model established by the Montreal Protocol extraordinarily successful at reversing ozone depletion).
25 See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 Geo.
L.J. 1565, 1607 (June 2008) (summarizing the principle as meaning that developed countries have to spend a significant amount of money on emissions
reduction, while developing countries do not).
26 See Sunstein, The World vs. the United States and China?, supra note 12, at
1698 (suggesting that existing stocks and current flows of emissions be considered on separate bases in determining commitments of participating countries in
subsequent climate change agreements).
27 See, e.g., UNFCCC, supra note 7, pmbl. (recognizing the need for developed
countries to act immediately to reduce emissions, and further recognizing that
developing countries face additional challenges from climate change).
28 E.g., id. at Annex I and Annex II (distinguishing between developed countries that have completed a transition to a market economy and those developed
countries that have not).
29 See id. art. 4.2(a) (asserting that developed countries commit themselves
specifically to limit their human-generated GHG emissions to demonstrate that
they “are taking the lead” under the Convention).
30 See UNFCCC, supra note 7, arts. 4.4, 4.5 (emphasizing that developed country Parties shall assist “developing country Parties . . . in meeting costs of adaptation” to the adverse effects of climate change, and that developed countries
will “take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance . . . the transfer
of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies and know-how to
. . . developing country Parties”).
31 See UNFCCC, supra note 7, art. 3.1 (“The Parties should protect the climate
system . . . on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead. . .”).
32 See id., pmbl. and arts. 3.2, 4.8-4.9 (recognizing that some developing countries have specific needs and special circumstances that merit differentiated
treatment – such as low-lying countries; small island countries; and countries
with areas prone to flooding and fragile mountainous ecosystems – and highlighting the vulnerability of the least developed countries).
33 See UNFCCC, supra note 7, art. 4.2(g) (explaining that parties may shift
their status under the Convention at any time).
34 See id. arts. 4.2(g), 19.
35 See generally id. (lacking formal guidance on how the Conference of the
Parties should determine country designations for purposes of CDR differentiation).
36 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto
Protocol, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/3145.php (last visited Mar.
19, 2010) (noting that while the UNFCCC encourages developed countries to
reduce GHG emissions, the Kyoto Protocol actually committed them to reduction targets).
37 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto Protocol Status of Ratification, http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/application/pdf/kp_ratification_20091203.pdf (last visited Mar. 19,
2010).
38 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, art. 3 (mandating that only developed
countries listed in Annex I shall limit their GHG emissions); see also id. art.
10 (stating all Parties reaffirm existing commitments “in pursuit of the ultimate
objective of the [Framework] Convention”).
39 See Sunstein, The World v. The United States and China?, supra note 12,
at 1682 (arguing that although China ratified the Kyoto Protocol, that decision
was meaningless to the international negotiation process because China’s ratification entails no obligations).
40 See generally Copenhagen Accord, supra note 6.
41 See China State Council Info. Office, White Paper: China’s Policies and
Actions on Climate Change § III (Oct. 29, 2008) available at http://www.
china.org.cn/government/news/2008-10/29/content_16681689.htm [hereinafter
White Paper: Climate Change] (citing CDR as a China guide in addressing
climate change).
42 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, art. 10.
43 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, art. 10; see also Copenhagen Accord,
supra note 6, at 4, 5 (committing Annex I Parties to achieve emissions targets
for 2020, and committing Non-Annex I Parties like China to implement mitigation actions).
44 See White Paper: Climate Change, supra note 41, at § III.
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45

See id. at § III (maintaining that, for their part, in addressing climate
change developing countries should merely adopt adaptation measures, reduce
emissions as much as possible, and generally fulfill their duties under the
UNFCCC); see also Sunstein, The World v. The United States and China?,
supra note 11, at 1682 (noting the reasons China refused to yield to U.S.-led
pressure to agree to emissions limitations under the Kyoto Protocol).
46 See Lieberthal, supra note 11, at 38 (detailing China’s suspicions that international demands for the nation to cut emissions are actually a thinly veiled
effort to impede China’s growth and development).
47 See The Impact of the 2008 Olympic Games On Human Rights and the Rule
of Law in China: Hearing Before the Congressional Executive Commission on
China, 110th Cong. 11 (Feb. 27, 2008) (statement of Roger R. Martella, Jr.,
Gen. Counsel, EPA) available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_house_hearings&docid=f:41150.pdf (testifying that the
Beijing Olympics demonstrated China’s world-class level of sophistication and
its ability to understand and address environmental issues).
48 See Gov.cn, China Fact File: Economic System, http://english.gov.cn/200602/08/content_182584.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2009) (explaining that economic reforms were the centerpiece of the Reform and Opening Policy, as
China transitioned from a planned economy to a market economy).
49 See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, As Leaders Wrestle With Downturn, Developing Nations Get Ringside Seats, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 2008, at A13 (noting the
clout of developing nations’ leaders at a November 2008 G20 summit on the
global economic crisis, especially Chinese President Hu Jintao, “a leader with a
fat checkbook and the power that comes with it”).
50 E.g., Jonathan Watts, China Wakes Up To the Dangers of Pollution, The
Guardian, July 18, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2007/jul/18/
china.pollution (last visited Feb. 18, 2009) (reporting that Beijing’s air quality
can be so poor sometimes that schoolchildren are not allowed to go outside to
play at recess); see also Elizabeth C. Economy, The Great Leap Backward?
The Costs of China’s Environmental Crisis, Foreign Aff., Sept./Oct. 2007 at 40
(noting that GHG emissions like particulate matter and sulfur dioxide contribute to respiratory problems in Chinese citizens and cause agriculture-harming
acid rain).
51 See Pew Center Report supra note 4, at 18 (reporting that together, China
and the United States emit forty percent of global GHGs, and that while China
is the current leader in annual emissions, China accounts for only eight percent
of historic emissions stocks).
52 See Economy, supra note 50, at 47 (citing the World Bank report’s controversial finding, which Beijing reportedly did not want publicly released, fearing
incitement of social unrest).
53 See Louisa Lim, Air Pollution Grows in Tandem With China’s Economy,
National Public Radio, May 22, 2007, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyId=10221268 (last visited Mar. 19, 2010) (explaining that the
main sources of pollution are industry, car emissions, and coal-processing).
54 See Andrew Jacobs, U.N. Report Points to Peril from Noxious ‘Brown
Clouds,’ N.Y. Times Nov. 13, 2008, at A6 (calling the resulting air a toxic mix
that can cause cardiovascular and respiratory disease).
55 See, e.g., Tougher Law to Curb Water Pollution, China Daily, Feb. 2, 2008,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/ china/2008-02/29/content_6494712.htm (last
visited Feb. 18, 2009) (reporting on amendments to the Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act, which involve tougher punishments for polluters through
increased fines); see also Steven M. Dickinson, Energy Efficiency Law Devoid
of Substance, China Economic Review, Oct. 2008, http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com/columnists/teven_m_dickinon/2008_10_01/An_empty_vessel.
html (last visited Mar. 19, 2010) (reporting that the primary goal of the Circular
Economy Law is to increase energy efficiency).
56 See Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Ann. Rep. 32, 133
(2008) (observing increased participation in environmental protests in the last
few years, particularly among the urban middle-class).
57 See Economy, supra note 50, at 46 (describing the threat that domestic environmental problems present to the Communist Party authority).
58 See UNFCCC, supra note 7, art. 3.1 (asserting the equitable basis that the
parties to the Convention rely on in the climate change regime); see also Christopher D. Stone, Common But Differentiated Responsibilities in International
Law, 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 276, 278 (chronicling the history of CDR, which is
present in the Treaty of Versailles, the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, and various United Nations agreements); Lieberthal supra note 11, at 3,
55 (arguing that if the United States and China cooperate on fighting climate
change, their collaboration will help establish a successful post-Kyoto agreement, and that their agreement should be based upon the principle of CDR).
59 See, e.g., Stone, supra note 58, at 277-80 (arguing that CDR creates an
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arbitrary distinction, and citing the principle as a primary cause of struggles in
climate negotiations).
60 See, e.g., id. at 290-91 (likening instruments that adhere to CDR to rescue
vehicles for developing countries).
61 See Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto, supra note 19, at 10571 (detailing
how countries in Africa are projected to lose nearly 4 percent of their GDP
from a 2.5 degree Celsius warming, whereas OECD Europe would lose 2.83
percent and the United States would only lose 0.45 percent).
62 See Stone, supra note 58, at 291-92 (arguing that the Polluter Pays principle
would be a better justification for differentiated responsibilities in MEAs than
general equitable considerations).
63 See Lieberthal supra note 11, at 38 (identifying the United States’ great institutional capacity and simultaneous refusal to accept GHG emissions targets as a
source of resentment to China).
64 See id. at 8 (noting alarming new studies that show rates of atmospheric
GHG accumulation have accelerated faster than expected because of China’s
rapid development).
65 Compare Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, art. 3.1 (excluding emerging economies like China from emissions reduction commitments), with Sunstein, Of
Montreal and Kyoto, supra note 19, at 10568-69 (correlating the Kyoto Protocol’s exclusion of developing nations with the United States’ refusal to ratify
the instrument).
66 See Lieberthal, supra note 11, at 25 (explaining the U.S. government’s concern that any benefit from emissions reductions in the U.S. would be cancelled
out by unregulated GHG emissions from China).
67 See UNFCCC, supra note 7, art. 4.8 (including all self-designated developing countries in the same category, without quantitative commitments).
68 See id. pmbl.
69 Compare White Paper: Climate Change, supra note 41, at § I (highlighting
China’s fragile environment, coastal areas vulnerable to sea level rise, and areas
prone to desertification), with UNFCCC, supra note 7, art. 4.8 (listing developing countries with “low-lying coastal areas,” “liable to . . . desertification” and
with “fragile ecosystems” as those most deserving of funding and technology
transfer from developed countries).
70 Id. Compare Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: China,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html (last
visited Feb. 18, 2009) (estimating China’s 2008 GDP at 4.222 billion USD),
with United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Vanuatu’s
First Report (1999), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/vannc1.pdf (last visited
Feb. 18, 2009) (reporting fellow developing country Vanuatu’s low development status and its extreme vulnerability as a small island nation), and Central
Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Vanuatu, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/nh.html#Intro (last visited Mar.
19, 2010) (estimating Vanuatu’s 2008 GDP at 560 million USD).
71 See UNFCCC, supra note 7, arts. 3.1, 4.8 (failing to define clearly which
countries should be subject to binding commitments and which should receive
special consideration).
72 See John M. Broder, Climate Goal is Supported By China and India,
N.Y.Times, Mar. 10, 2010, at A9 (citing EU climate commissioner Connie
Hedegaard’s hope that UNFCCC nations will create an enforceable climate
regime by 2011).
73 See Wiener, supra note 7, at 1809; see also Sunstein, The World vs. the
United States and China?, supra note 12, at 1681 (noting the U.S. Senate’s
unanimous conclusion that the United States had more to lose than to gain in
ratifying the Kyoto Protocol because developing country GHG emissions were
exempted).
74 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Compliance Under the Kyoto Protocol, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/compliance/
items/2875.php (last visited Mar. 19, 2010) (reporting that only Canada,
Greece, and Croatia had compliance issues).
75 See Wiener, supra note 7, at 1808 (explaining that China’s actual emissions
have continually exceeded predictions; for example, in 1998, the U.S. government projected that China would surpass the United States as the leader in
emissions in 2030).
76 See Pew Center Report, supra note 51, at 16 (describing the trajectory of
climate change and predicting ever stronger impacts resulting from current
emission levels).
77 See id. at 15 (asserting that prospects for a successful new climate change
agreement depend largely upon China’s actions).
78 See Sunstein, The World vs. the United States and China?, supra note 26, at
1685 (detailing how projections show past major GHG emitters will continue
to contribute to climate change, but emerging powers like China and India will
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also become significant emitters).
79 See UNFCCC, supra note 7, pmbl. (discussing global GHG emissions in
terms of historical and current outputs) (emphasis added).
80 Cf. Sunstein, The World vs. the United States and China?, supra note 26, at
1686 (predicting that the highest GHG emitters of the past may not be the high
emitters of the future).
81 Cf. Pew Center Report, supra note 51, at 18 (reporting that the United States
is the largest contributor to historic GHG stocks in the atmosphere, accounting
for twenty-nine percent of emissions since 1850).
82 See Sunstein, The World vs. the United States and China?, supra note 26, at
1686 (noting projections that developing world nations like China, Indonesia,
India, and Brazil are expected to contribute no less than 55 percent of total
GHG emissions by 2030).
83 See Pew Center Report, supra note 4, at 14 (arguing that the world cannot
meet the climate change challenge without China’s full participation).
84 See generally Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3 (failing to include any reference
to the special situation and special capabilities of emerging economies).
85 See id. pmbl. and art. 2 (stating that the parties should fulfill their obligations
pursuant to the commitments articulated in Article 4 of the UNFCCC).
86 See id. art 2.3; see also UNFCCC, supra note 7, art. 4.8.
87 Compare White Paper: Climate Change, supra note 41, at Foreword (asserting that China has a fragile eco-environment and is vulnerable to adverse
climate change impacts), with Sunstein, The World vs. the United States and
China?, supra note 12, at 1683 (contrasting the projected, comparatively minimal impact on GDP for countries like China, Russia, and the United States with
the massive losses in GDP projected for African countries).
88 See Pew Center Report, supra note 4, at 14 (calling China’s reemergence
since 1978 extraordinary, and noting the immense power China has acquired in
the last thirty years).
89 See United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing Countries, List of Least Developed Countries, http://www.unohrlls.org/
en/ldc/related/62/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2010) (defining forty-nine countries as
“least developed;” China is not included on the list).
90 See Elisabeth Rosenthal, Booming China Leads the World in Emissions of
Carbon Dioxide, a Study Finds, N.Y. Times, June 14, 2008, at A5 (quoting a
European report finding that China’s 2007 emissions were fourteen percent
higher than the United States’ emissions).
91 See Elisabeth Rosenthal and Andrew C. Revkin, Science Panel Says Global
Warming Is “Unequivocal,” N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 2007, at A1 [hereinafter
Rosenthal & Revkin] (citing the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s
2007 report, which concluded that climate change is definitely occurring and
that human activity is the primary cause).
92 See generally UNFCCC, supra note 7 (creating a system that does not regulate major emitters like China).
93 See id. at Annex I and Annex II (listing developed countries like the United
Kingdom, France, Australia, and the United States); see also Lieberthal, supra
note 11, at 36 (describing China as a country with problems similar to developing nations, but with many attributes of a developed, industrialized nation).
94 See Lieberthal, supra note 11, at 35 (stating many non-Chinese do not comprehend that China lacks the institutional and technological capacity of a fully
developed nation).
95 See id. at 34 (describing the difficulties Chinese leaders face in balancing the
competing priorities of the developed and the developing areas of the country).
96 See Howard W. French, Grinding Poverty Defies China’s Boom, Int’l
Herald Tribune, Jan. 13, 2008, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/01/13/asia/poverty.php (citing a World Bank report estimating that
300 million people in China still live below poverty levels).
97 See United Nations Development Programme, Human Development
Reports, http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2010) (categorizing world nations as having either high, medium, or low human development; China falls into the medium group, ranking 92nd of the 182 nations on
the list).
98 See Lieberthal, supra note 11, at 36 (characterizing China as a country in an
uncomfortable transition stage).
99 See UNFCCC, supra note 7, pmbl. (indicating indirectly that developed
countries should carry most of the burden when noting that “the largest share of
historical and current emissions of [GHGs] has originated in developed countries”).
100 See UNFCCC, supra note 7, pmbl., art.4(g) (describing the climate change
issue as a “common concern of humankind” and setting forth that any party
may choose to be bound by the Convention’s emissions reduction standards).
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101 See

Lieberthal, supra note 11, at 38 (reporting China’s belief that it is unreasonable to demand the nation to commit to GHG reduction targets because they
are not sufficiently developed).
102 See, e.g., Neil MacFarquhar and John M. Broder, U.N. Climate Chief Quits,
Deepening Sense of Disarray, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 2010, at A12 (calling the
Copenhagen COP “largely unsuccessful” because it failed to produce a binding international treaty “but instead generated mostly acrimony and a series of
unenforceable pledges”).
103 See Wiener, supra note 7, at 1805 (explicating that China could be engaged
by the international community through several distinct methods).
104 See, e.g., World Bank, Statement from World Bank China Country Director
on “Cost of Pollution in China” Report, July 11, 2007, http://go.worldbank.
org/68GG2KJ8Z0 (last visited Mar. 19, 2010) [hereinafter World Bank Statement] (reporting the finding that air pollution contributes to a huge economic
cost to China and is also leading to higher incidences of respiratory diseases
and cancer among Chinese citizens); see also Wiener, supra note 7, at 1805
(warning that climate change impacts could exacerbate pre-existing political
and social stresses within China, and positing that as a result, leadership on climate change may soon look more favorable to the government).
105 See World Bank Statement, supra note 104 and accompanying text.
106 See World Bank, Cost of Pollution in China, 19 (Feb. 2007), available
at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPREGTOPENVIRONMENT/
Resources/China_Cost_of_Pollution.pdf [hereinafter World Bank Report]
(noting epidemiological evidence that outdoor air pollution is a contributing
cause of mortality and that a dramatic increase in cancer cases in China is
attributable to worsening air and water pollution).
107 See Wiener, supra note 7, at 1817 (observing that a progressive Chinese climate policy could bring simultaneous benefits by controlling local pollution).
108 See id. at 1823-24 (explaining that benefits flowing to China from a successful international climate regime depend upon reaching a cooperative deal with
other countries).
109 See id. (arguing that in order to persuade China to join an international climate regime, the structure of the regime itself must offer specific incentives
to China and outlining several reasons why China would benefit from actively
participating in a climate change regime).
110 See, e.g., Lieberthal, supra note 11, at 36 (asserting that China wants to
be seen as a constructive player on the international stage, and that this will
increase its incentive to participate in an international climate regime).
111 E.g., Officials Responsible for Pollution Accidents, Xinhua News Agency,
Apr. 25, 2006, available at http://www.china.org.cn/english/2006/Apr/166691.
htm (quoting a Chinese Environmental Protection official on the great threat
pollution poses to social stability in China).
112 See Pew Center Report, supra note 4, at 20 (cataloguing the harmful air pollutants released into China’s atmosphere that present a health threat to Chinese
citizens).
113 See Economy, supra note 50, at 46 (noting China’s leaders are aware that
air pollution causes indirect effects in terms of threats to social stability, public
health, and continued economic growth, which together could threaten the
authority of the Communist Party).
114 See Congressional-Executive Commission on China, supra note 56, at 13437 (describing recent protests organized against the construction of chemical
plants and rail line extensions).
115 See id .at 135-37 (calling public protests significant because they represent
an unprecedented example of public participation that is at least tacitly allowed
by the CCP).
116 See e.g., Lieberthal, supra note 11, at 35 (describing how Chinese diplomats
are increasingly being asked to explain why the nation is not doing more to
reduce its emissions).
117 See, e.g., Small Island Developing States Network, Vulnerability and
Adaptation to Climate Change in Small Island Developing States 7 (2007),
available at http://unfccc.int/files/adaptation/adverse_effects_and_response_
measures_art_48/application/pdf/200702_sids_adaptation_bg.pdf (stating that
small island developing states are among the most vulnerable countries in the
world to climate change and yet produce extremely low levels of GHGs, meaning that they will suffer disproportionately from the damaging impacts of climate change).
118 See Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto, supra note 19, at 10571 (noting that
countries such as India and all of Africa are projected to lose as much as 4.93
percent of their GDP from a 2.5 degree Celsius warming, whereas the United
States would only lose 0.45 percent of GDP).
119 See Wiener, supra note 7, at 1816, 1825 (arguing that enlightened pragmatism is the best approach for the international community to move both China
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and the United States to meaningful participation in a climate change regime).
120 See Sunstein, The World vs. the United States and China?, supra note 12, at
1686 (indicating that China, India, and Indonesia have all increased emissions
by more than fifty percent in the last fifteen years).
121 See UNFCCC, supra note 7, arts. 4.4, 4.5 (stating that only countries in
Annex II shall assist in providing financial and technical assistance to developing country parties).
122 See Lieberthal, supra note 11, at 36 (describing the awkward stage of China’s development, where the country has modernized significantly but is not yet
fully developed).

123 See,

e.g., Rosenthal & Revkin, supra note 91 (reporting on the widespread
consensus that climate change is real and that human activity is causing it).
124 See Barbara Finamore, China Officially Associates With the Copenhagen
Accord, Mar. 11, 2010, http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/bfinamore/china_officially_associates_wi.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2010) (noting China and India’s
official association with the Accord “alleviates some previous concerns about
their engagement while breathing new life” into the UNFCCC).
125 Cf. Magraw, supra note 20, at 10578 (asserting that many factors weigh
enter into a nation’s evaluation of its interests in an MEA, and arguing that
cost-benefit analysis is only one of those factors).

Endnotes: Legal Foundations for NGO Participation in Climate Treaty Negotiations continued from page 56
1
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Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, arts. 6-7, June 25, 1998,
2161 U.N.T.S. 447, 38 I.L.M. 517, available at http://www.unece.org/env/pp/
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11 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Econ. Comm’n of Eur., Decision I/7: Review
of Compliance, ECE/MP.PP/2/Add.8, (Apr. 4, 2004), available at http://www.
unece.org/env/pp/documents/mop1/ece.mp.pp.2.add.8.e.pdf [hereinafter Lucca
Decision]. Almaty Agreement, supra note 8.
12 Lucca Decision, supra note 12, at §18.
13 Id., at §37.
14 Aarhus Convention, supra note 8, at art. 17.
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meetings/unfccc_calendar/items/2655.php (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
16 UNFCCC, Adoption of the Rules of Procedure, FCCC/CP/1996/2 (May 22,
1996), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop2/02.pdf (taking note of
UNFCCC Article 7.3 that “the Conference of the Parties shall, at its first session, adopt its own rules of procedure as well as those of the subsidiary bodies
established by the Convention ...” but merely “inviting” the Parties to adopt the
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Bodies which begin on page 2).
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18 Id.
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